The island of Sicily has had as bloody a past as any place on Earth. Waves of invaders crashed on its shores, from prehistory to World War II. Long before the major characters of our drama enter the stage, other actors had come and gone, or stayed to be submerged in the general population. Sicels and Sicani had been struggling for mastery since long before recorded history, when two new players appeared first (by a narrow margin) the Phoenicians, and second, the Greeks.

     The Phoenicians, originally from Tyre but later from the Tyrian colony of Carthage, settled in various spots chosen to guard their trade routes. As their interests by 700 BC involved the collection of raw materials from scattered areas, from Tarshish in Spain and the settlements in Sardinia to outposts on the Atlantic coast of Africa, they had a vital interest in keeping their trade routes open and free from competition. For them Sicily was the ideal island for settlement, near as it was to everything, with decent harbors and conveniently near Carthage. Hence the Phoenicians settled at various places, beginning at Motya, before 720 BC. Motya is an island just off the coast; the Phoenicians used it as a base for expansion into Sicily. Their area of influence, as recognized by treaty with Rome in 509, places western Sicily under their rule. Certainly they had significant cities there; Soli and Panormos were two of the most important. Motya was destroyed and refounded as Lilybaeum on a site further south in 397.

Phoenician galley. Tetrashekel of Sidon; lot 135.

          Phoenician affairs changed radically at the end of the seventh century for three main reasons. First, the people of Carthage were thrown largely on their own resources, as the Phoenicians, especially those of Tyre, suffered greatly under the assaults of first the Assyrians and, later, the Babylonians. Nebuchadrezzar did not actually take Tyre at the end of his all but interminable siege; but he certainly disrupted trade. Meanwhile the colonies had to fend for themselves. Thus they looked to the city which was the most powerful of them all, namely Carthage. Even then the ties were too strong to be lightly shaken off; but they were somewhat loosened.

     The second was the arrival of the first Greeks in the area. The first Greek sailors hailed from Phokaia, and they set up a colony in Massilia (Marseilles). Even Spain was not immune: the Phokaians set up one or two colonies there as well, notably in Ampurias and Mainake (Malaga). Although the latter was taken and destroyed by the Carthaginians, who wanted to protect their monopoly, Massilia survived to limit the Phoenicians' northward expansion.

     Others went to Sicily. The earliest Greek foundation was the city of Naxos; another early foundation was Zancle, settled by Euboeans, later Messana, connecting Sicily with the mainland at Rhegium, at which spot the same Euboeans settled. From there they expanded, founding Leontini and Katane; other Greek cities sent colonies as well. Megara founded Megara Hyblaea, and, most notably of all, settlers from Corinth founded Syracuse.

     These cities were far enough from the Phoenician colonies to be no more than a nuisance for the first century or so; but with the founding of further cities by the various parties the Phoenicians began to look for ways of dealing with the potential threat. In the seventh century the worst problem was the foundation of Selinos, right on the border between Sicel and Punic territory.

     By the beginning of the sixth century the conflict entered a more serious phase. The Carthaginians, freed from more than nominal ties to their mother city, embarked on a policy of vigorous expansion. At first they paid little attention to Sicily, as their cities there were safe enough, and new Greek and Siciliot foundations (e. g. Akragas in 580 or thereabouts) were east of Selinos. Carthage had bigger fish to fry. In Spain most of the Phoenician colonies had come under the sway of the native Iberian city of Tartessos. Carthage wasn't about to let this go on; the city was taken and utterly destroyed some time after 550. The annoying Greek foundations got their quietus around this time, no doubt as punishment for an alliance with Tartessos. The pesky Phokaians suffered crushing defeat on Corsica at the battle of Alalia in 535, when a combined Punic - Etruscan force trounced the force of the colony there.

     Unfortunately for Carthage this gave the Greeks breathing room in Sicily, which they used to advantage. Selinos, Akragas and Himera were regarded with a wary eye; but around 580 BC one Pentathlus landed a force of troops at the later site of Lilybaeum, to assist the Selinuntines against Motya, which was allied to Segesta, at that time an enemy of Selinos. Here in Sicily the old ethnic feuds flourished, along with their colonies, and the disunity made for the sort of troubled waters in which empire-builders loved to fish. Pentathlus was utterly defeated, but the Phoenicians - Carthage was still just another colony - did not bother to follow up their victory. The Greeks there were a nuisance, not a menace.

     Carthage changed the rules after 550. Approximately the same time as Alalia, no doubt for the same reason, the Carthaginians campaigned in Sicily. They brought some of the island under Carthaginian control, and that part was probably that of the Phoenician colonies. Whatever the campaign, the result was that the Phoenician presence on the island was thoroughly Carthaginian.

Siculo-Punic Tetradrachm. Lot 163.

     Against the Sicilian Greeks Carthage took action only in response to provocations. Against the Siciliots, however, what evidence there is indicates that at least some of the Greek "provocation" was done at the request of Siciliotes responding to Carthaginian assaults. When the Spartan Dorieus landed and attempted to set up a colony near Segesta, the Carthaginian forces allied with Segesta put a quick stop to the enterprise. The remnants of the force were settled by the Selinuntines in the outpost of Minoa.

     One city everyone discounted in the sixth century was Syracuse, it was of little importance at first. Gradually the rulers of Syracuse began to absorb, "by hook or by crook", as it were, territory bordering the original settlement. The rise of Syracuse to power status, however, is the result of the rise of remarkable tyrants in the city of Gela, namely Hippocrates (from 492) and, even more notably, his successor Gelon. Hippocrates conquered many of the smaller cities, particularly Naxos, Zancle and Leontini, and tried to take Syracuse.

     He failed; but he did get help from an unexpected quarter. In 493 the Ionian revolt against Persia had collapsed; many of the Ionians went abroad looking for a new home. Hippocrates was only to happy to help. A large body of veteran troops, full of gratitude to the tyrant, would provide just what he needed. In the event he got less than he bargained for.

     Hs successor Gelon quickly made significant improvements to the city's military strength, and used every possible means to bring the rest of the Greek cities under his control. He wasn't, however, the only one with this ambition. Anaxilas of Rhegium, who had set himself up in Gela, had his own ambitions, and decided to stir up trouble for Gelon. He exploited the old rivalry between Selinos and Akragas, and as the latter was allied with Syracuse, he picked up Selinos.

     Anaxilas realized that his coalition was no match for a newly energized Syracuse, so he called in the other power on the island, namely Carthage. A minor incident in the politics of Himera provided the excuse, and the Carthaginians needed little encouragement.

     In the spring of 480 Gelon became aware of the Carthaginian plans against him and his allies. He had been intending to send assistance to the Greeks at war with Persia; in response to the closer threat he mobilized his army before it was needed.

     Hamilcar, the Punic general, landed in Panormos expecting an easy victory. Indeed, he is said to have remarked when he landed that the war was essentially over, in that he had already confronted the only enemy he feared, namely the sea. He had an army which was far larger than the mere tyrant of Akragas, whose army had taken Himera. In any event the Carthaginians soon had Himera under close siege.

Panormos. Bronze Hemilitron. Lot 55.

     The Akragentines appealed to Syracuse for help. As Gelon's army had been partially mobilized to send to Greece it was quickly mustered and sent to Himera. On reaching the disputed territory the Syracusans began to hit the besiegers hard, attacking their foragers and adding their weight to the Akragentine sallies from the city.

     The turning point came as a result of a trick. Hamilcar appealed to Selinos for troops; Gelon disguised some of his men as Selinuntines, and they got into the Punic camp before anyone realized the deception. In the ensuing battle the Carthaginians were routed; Hamilcar was killed and most of the Punic ships were burnt. A few survivors limped home; most were killed or sold as slaves.

Tetradrachm of Syracuse, 423-420 BC. Lot 58.

     Round one to Gelon. He gained immensely from the battle, as all his enemies sued for peace. He granted it with few conditions; but in fact it made him virtual dictator of Greek Sicily.

     The next incident had nothing to do with Carthage, at least at first. While Gelon lived, Carthage remained in fear of an invasion; Gelon, however, knew when to stop He died in 478, at peace with nearly everybody. His successors lost his power, and by the time the next player, Athens, appears on the scene Sicily was back to its old ways of constant bickering with the occasional local war. Notable, however, was the revolt of the smaller cities against the tyrant Thrasybulus; in 466 a coalition of cities, including both Akragas and Selinus, set aside their rivalries to overthrow this tyrant. A little later, in 453, Selinos was involved in a war with Segesta over some obscure boundary dispute; the Selinuntines won, and the Segestans appealed to, of all cities, Athens. Military aid was refused; for the moment at least.

     By the 430s Syracuse had recovered something of her earlier ambition. Akragas had been beaten in a short war, and the attempt by the Sicels under Ducetus to gain a position had been crushed. Two cities alone remained to challenge Syracuse, namely Rhegium in Bruttium and Leontini, and they had significant Athenian backing. Syracuse, as a colony of Corinth with strong ties, was thus tied to Sparta inasmuch as she had any ties, and hence Athens regarded Syracusan ambition as a potential threat.

     The Athenian expedition to Syracuse is famous mainly as the disaster which decisively turned the tide of the Peloponnesian War, and resulted in the destruction both of the Athenian fleet and the army. Certainly their initial activities in besieging the place were to their advantage. The Athenian loss of Lamachus, cut down with a squad of hoplites when intercepted by Syracusan cavalry, and the Spartan Glippius's success in collecting allies and catching the Athenians napping turned the tide. The arrival of reinforcements from Athens in 413 only increased the final Athenian losses. The Athenian general Nicias finally realized this, and attempted to leave with what remained; but the fatal lunar eclipse of 27 August 413 caused the superstitious general to wait nearly a month in response to this omen. By then it was too late. Of perhaps 50,000 troops sent from Athens, 7000 lived long enough to surrender, and perhaps a few hundred survived their imprisonment.

     In Carthage they watched all this with interest, as they looked to try to turn the turmoil in Sicily to their advantage. Those cities which had allied themselves with Athens were faced with loss of territory. One of these, Aegesta, had a border dispute with Selinos. As Selinos was the stronger they had earlier appealed to Carthage, which was not interested, and then to Leontini, whose appeal to Athens had such notable results. They appealed to Carthage again; this time the Carthaginians decided to act. After much debate they dispatched one Hannibal, grandson of the Hamilcar defeated at Himera, a man who hated anything Greek. Hannibal looked for a pretext to wage war. At first he sent some Lybian mercenaries to wage war for him; in the first battle they set upon the Selinuntines and defeated them with heavy loss, as the latter held their enemies in contempt. Both sides appealed for allies; the one giving Hannibal the pretext for open intervention, and the other cashing in its alliance with Syracuse against the common enemy.

Selinos tetradrachm, 466-416 BC. Lot 57.

     Hannibal set about raising a massive army to settle affairs to his liking, and particularly to wipe out his grandfather's disgrace. Diodoros tells us that the fleet used to convey this army to Sicily consisted of fifteen hundred transports guarded by sixty triremes. His army was estimated at somewhere between one and two hundred thousand men, as well as siege equipment of all sorts. Hannibal left no doubt that this time he was going to deal with the opposition in no uncertain way.

     Hannibal chose his landing-point carefully. The position was a promontory of land at Lilybaeum; it was opposite to Lybia, and a good defensive position. As the Selinuntines had sent cavalry into the field to do as much damage as possible to the Punic settlements in anticipation, some of their cavalry were in the area, and reported back to their city. They immediately sent to Syracuse for assistance. Unfortunately for them the Syracusans had not anticipated an invasion at that time, and it took some while to raise troops. Thus the Carthaginians had the advantage.

     Hannibal himself understood the importance of trying to keep Syracuse neutral. As the Syracusans at the time were a democracy, simple gestures might at least keep them debating, so Hannibal sent all his ships to Motya and had them beached, to give the impression that he had no designs on anything east of Selinos. At the same time he collected the troops of his local allies and set out toward his objective.

     Overwhelming such resistance as he encountered in the field, Hannibal quickly invested the city. The Carthaginians at this time were renowned for their siegecraft, and Hannibal put it to good use. He built six enormous siege-towers, the forerunners of the "helepolis" of Demetrius the Besieger; these he advanced to the walls with the assistance of battering-rams and swarms of misslie-troops; his archers and slingers played havoc with the defenders.

     In Selinos the defenders were in a sorry state. Quite apart from the massive armaments directed against them, they had received a rude awakening from their dreams of peace. As the only Greek ally of Carthage during the earlier war they expected some measure of indulgence; they had therefore not maintained their defenses. Nonetheless they did their best to resist, in the expectation of help from their allies, especially from Syracuse. The entire population worked: the young men fought, the old men acted as the supply train, and the women supplied food and arrows.

     Hannibal began his assaults in waves, promising to give the city over to the soldiers to sack. His troops, lead by his Campanian mercenaries, easily broke through the walls, but got bogged down in the dense streets of the town, and here and there found themselves defeated in detail. Despite their ardor the attacking troops found themselves unable to secure their foothold, and as evening fell Hannibal withdrew them.

     The Selinuntians sent messengers to Gela, Akragas ands Syracuse, begging for immediate assistance, as they did not expect to be so successful for very long. The first two cities did not dare to set out without the troops from Syracuse, as their armies alone were insufficient; what army the Syracusans had in the field was engaged elsewhere. The latter city broke off its operations, but took some time to gather further troops in the expectation that the siege would settle down to a blockade now that the first assaults had failed. They were mistaken.

     Hannibal opened the next day's action by the tried and true method of a general assault on all sides, with particular emphasis on the breach his rams had made earlier. This time he sent his troops in waves, clearing the town out little by little. For nine days the street fighting continued; no quarter was asked or given, and the city had to be taken house by house. The citizens set up barricades in the narrow streets; the men holding off the attackers while the women and children pelted the enemy with stones from the housetops.

At first the Carthaginians lost heavily; later, however, their reserves began to gain the upper hand. Eventually the exhausted defenders were forced out of the streets; most of the defenders retreated to the market-place, where they all died fighting.

     Meanwhile the invaders scattered to plunder, pillaging and burning all the houses, killing everyone they met. They even made it a point to loot the temples, regarding which Diodoros relates with outrage that they alone, of all the barbarians, did not hesitate to commit the sacrilege of hauling out those in sanctuary there as well as collecting whatever they could loot. Only they, he tells us, would spare their enemies in order to plunder their temples. This action, along with their well-known habit of sacrificing small children to Ba'al-Hammon (well documented from excavations in the Tophet, or sacrificial area, of Carthage in 1922), helped confirm their reputation as truly barbaric in the eyes of the Greeks.

     Sixteen thousand inhabitants of the city were killed, five thousand captured; a few escaped as refugees. Their allies, appalled at the actions of the Carthaginians, resolved at least to aid the fugitives. These, numbering 2600, made their way to Akragas, where the citizens received them with all possible kindness, both as a city and as private citizens; they also, as their coin-designs indicate, resolved to continue their efforts on behalf of the stricken city.

Tetradrachm of Akragas; the crab taking the selinon leaf under its protection. Lot 50.

     The Syracusans, who so far had not done very much, sent an embassy to Hannibal, requesting him to accept a ransom for the captives, and also urging him to respect the temples. Hannibal, flushed with success, told them that as the people of Selinos had been unable to defend their liberty that they no longer deserved it; and that the gods had obviously abandoned the city, and if they didn't care about their temples, why should he? Needless to say this did not change the opinion of the Greeks that they were having to deal with barbarians.

     Hannibal had dealt with his official business; he next had a private score to settle. He marched off to Himera to avenge his grandfather's defeat by the total destruction of the place. In the event he pressed the siege so well that despite heroic efforts the defenders soon realized that the cause was lost; they marched out to Zancle, by now renamed Messena. Those defenders which remained Hannibal took after bitter fighting, then took them to the site of the earlier battle and sacrificed them.

     The affairs of the next two centuries showed what a nest of hornets this action had stirred up. A change of government at Syracuse sent their best general into exile; he based himself in the ruins of Selinos and from there ravaged Carthaginian territory. Attempting to capitalize on his success he attempted to take over in Syracuse but was defeated and killed. Meanwhile the Carthaginians returned in 406, intending to expand their conquests, and brought another huge army. With this they managed to take, and destroy, Akragas with their usual savagery, even destroying the tombs outside the city. They returned the next year and destroyed whatever remained. They then proceeded to take Gela, despite the attempts of the Syracusans to relieve it. The Carthaginians reached their high-water mark in Sicily with their capture of Gela; a succession of tyrants of Syracuse, however, was destined to turn that tide, beginning with Dionysius shortly thereafter.

     As a city Selinos was of minor importance; as a cause of war between Carthage and the Greek states it ultimately led to the downfall of both. Carthage, attempting to deal with the Greek cities, only united them against her, and not only did it lead to the near-conquest of Carthage itself by Agathokles, but ultimately to the intervention of a much greater threat, namely Rome.